SKILLEMALL.ai

BC openclaw-workflow

OC-Flow:为你的 OpenClaw 注入"确定性"灵魂。OC-Flow 完全嵌入在 OpenClaw 体系内,赋予 Agent 完整的流程控制能力:条件分支、循环遍历、精准等待、状态管理。通过 YAML 剧本实现固定流程、多步循环、严苛逻辑的任务。适用场景:财务办公、开发运维、个人助理。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: 铲屎将军 v1.0.3 MIT-0 22 files body ≈ 3 903 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 50/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
50/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic scripts/engine/sandbox.py:117
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input
    exec(compile(code, "<openclaw-workflow-sandbox>", "exec"), namespace)

Files scanned: 22. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 50/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 137 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3903 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 147: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 40 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 137 items
  • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real workflow automation skill, but installed workflows can run local code, make network requests, send messages, and touch OpenClaw session files with limited containment.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026