SKILLEMALL.ai

BB wof-predict

Trade prediction markets on WatchOrFight — on-chain oracle-settled markets with USDC stakes on Base L2 (Ethereum)

ClawHub Agent Skills author: wof-developers v1.2.4 2 files body ≈ 1 626 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
72/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:19
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Risk: The external npm CLI uses a raw wallet private key and can sign irreversible USDC transactions. <br>
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:62
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    | `PRIVATE_KEY` | Yes | Wallet private key (needs ETH for gas + USDC for stakes) |

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 10 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1626 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 113: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 21 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is coherent for on-chain prediction-market trading, but it asks an external npm CLI to use a raw wallet private key for irreversible USDC transactions.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026