SKILLEMALL.ai

CF growth-engineer

Growth Engineer for mobile apps and agent runtimes including OpenClaw and Hermes. Correlate analytics, crashes, billing, feedback, store signals, and repo context into proposal drafts that can flow into agent chat, GitHub issues, or draft pull requests.

ClawHub Hermes author: wotaso-dev v1.0.210 MIT-0 46 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 15 986 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 57/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: scripts/openclaw-growth-*.mjs

GeneratorGitHubAI and agentsSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
65/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
65
Quality 40%
66
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
57/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: scripts/openclaw-growth-*.mjs
Tools and files w 18
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Execution cost w 6
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. For Hermes the description must be one sentence under 60 characters; move the conditions to a "When to Use" section.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
  3. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 11

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 11
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/openclaw-growth-preflight.mjs:999
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/openclaw-growth-start.mjs:1252
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/openclaw-growth-start.mjs:1351
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)
    const result = await runShellCommand('curl -fsSL https://asccli.sh/install | bash', 600_000);
    code literal
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/openclaw-growth-status.mjs:192
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/openclaw-growth-wizard.mjs:653
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key scripts/openclaw-growth-wizard.mjs:3496
    Private key material (key header without key body; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const ASC_PRIVATE_KEY_BEGIN = '-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
    header onlyquoted
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/openclaw-growth-status.mjs:450
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (destination is a well-known publishing service; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const fallback = await runShell(`curl -fsS -H ${quote('Accept: application/vnd.github+json')} -H ${quote(`Authorization: Bearer ${token}`)} ${quote(`https://api.github.com/repos/${repo}`)} >/dev/null`
    known servicequoted
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/openclaw-growth-status.mjs:465
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (destination is a well-known publishing service; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const authCheck = await runShell(`curl -fsS -H ${quote('Accept: application/vnd.github+json')} -H ${quote(`Authorization: Bearer ${token}`)} https://api.github.com/user >/dev/null`, { timeoutMs });
    known servicequoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/openclaw-growth-wizard.mjs:2938
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "Run with sudo: sudo bash .openclaw/secret-runner/install.sh" >&2
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/openclaw-growth-wizard.mjs:3043
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    '1. Run `sudo bash .openclaw/secret-runner/install.sh` from this workspace.',
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/openclaw-growth-wizard.mjs:3108
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    process.stdout.write(`  sudo bash ${path.relative(process.cwd(), kit.installScriptPath)}\n`);
    code literal

Files scanned: 37. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-long-hermes description is 253 chars; the Hermes authoring standard requires ≤ 60 (one sentence, ending with a period)
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 15986 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/openclaw-growth-*.mjs
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: scripts/openclaw-growth-*.mjs
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: scripts/openclaw-growth-*.mjs
  • 30Running it twice. 58 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 15986 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 60Consistency. The Hermes dialect needs category and tags
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 276 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 36 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 25 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (15 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -317 of 22 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 253: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 26 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 276 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (25 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 5)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill appears to support real growth-analysis automation, but installing or running it can make lasting system, scheduler, credential, and external-delivery changes that deserve manual review.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 5 Aug 2026