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FD stocks-quant-assistant

(no description)

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Owen v3.1.0 MIT-0 11 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 837 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceTelegramInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
3/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
5
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:94
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.stock-monitor.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:96
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    sudo launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.stock-monitor.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:184
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    └── LaunchAgents/         # macOS 定时任务
Medium and low: 9
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence health_check.py:42
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    plist = os.path.expanduser('~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.stock-monitor.plist')
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence setup.py:17
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    PLIST_PATH = os.path.join(os.path.expanduser('~'), 'Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.stock-monitor.plist')
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence setup.py:133
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    run(f"launchctl load {PLIST_PATH}", check=False)
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence setup.py:154
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    result = run(f'(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v stock_monitor.py; echo "{cron_line}") | crontab -', timeout=5)
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence setup.py:213
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    print(f"  launchctl load {PLIST_PATH}     # 启动")
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence stock_monitor.py:66
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    plist_path = os.path.expanduser('~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.stock-monitor.plist')
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence stock_monitor.py:110
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    print(f"  launchctl load {plist_path}", file=sys.stderr)
    code literal
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url stock_monitor.py:1029
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    f'https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage',
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention setup.py:154
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (string literal in code, not executed)
    result = run(f'(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v stock_monitor.py; echo "{cron_line}") | crontab -', timeout=5)
    code literal

Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 13 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 837 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -213 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This stock alert skill matches its stated purpose, but it needs Review because it automatically creates background jobs and includes helper scripts that can expose messaging secrets or change system settings.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026