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BF evo-skill-creator

能力创建者 — 创建具有自我学习、持续进化能力的领域专家智能体 Skill。 通过 /evo-skill-creator 命令唤醒，也可通过自然语言唤醒。 支持以下命令（命令式或自然语言均可触发）： - go：创建新角色、帮我做一个智能体、创建一个XX角色 - learn：学习一下、研究一下XX知识、深入学习 - scan：扫描一下最新趋势、看看有什么新动态 - plan：制定学习计划、更新计划、规划一下 - review：评审一下、检查角色质量、升级角色、进化一下 - suggest：给你提个建议、我觉得你应该、你怎么看 - status：你最近状态怎么样、你干了什么、现在情况如何 角色称呼：能力创建者、创建者、evo-skill-creator

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Wu Yao v1.0.0 MIT-0 53 files body ≈ 2 041 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 46/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: memory/private/README.md, references/settings.local.json.template

AnalyzerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
66
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
46/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: memory/private/README.md, references/settings.local.json.template
Tools and files w 18
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence memory/knowledge/agent-design/auto-tick-mechanism.md:42
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    创建 `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.evo-skill-creator.tick.plist`，实现登录后自动启动定期任务。
    quoted
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump memory/learning-plan.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (3) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    memory/learning-plan.md, memory/scene-index.md, memory/watchlist.md
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention memory/knowledge/agent-design/auto-tick-mechanism.md:19
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e

Files scanned: 53. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: memory/private/README.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: references/settings.local.json.template

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: memory/private/README.md, references/settings.local.json.template
  • 0Tools and files. 2 referenced file(s) missing: memory/private/README.md, references/settings.local.json.template
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Steps. 126 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2041 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low The response is described with custom markup (8 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 328: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 25 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 126 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 3)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is not clearly malicious, but it gives an agent broad authority to create, modify, schedule, and upgrade other agents, with loose triggers and privileged permission templates that deserve careful review.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026