SKILLEMALL.ai

BC alipayplus-integration

Alipay+ Payment Integration Assistant. Helps Acquirers and Mobile Service Providers quickly integrate Alipay+ payments, including customer-presented mode payment and merchat-presented mode payment. This skill can help on configuration generation, signature verification testing, asynchronous notification debugging (ACQP only), and reconciliation file processing.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Lizzie v1.0.0 MIT-0 16 files · 5 scripts body ≈ 1 812 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

IntegrationSoftware developmentFinanceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
78
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key references/signature-guide.md:107
    Private key material (key header without key body; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    String pem = privateKey.replace("-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
    header onlyquoted
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key references/signature-guide.md:390
    Private key material (key header without key body; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    String pem = privateKey.replace("-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
    header onlyquoted
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/webhook-guide.md:729
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (documentation of a security skill)
    # Example: https://abc1….io/alipayplus/notify
    security skill
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Read Write Bash WebFetch
  • low Secrets in code secret-private-key references/config-template.json:8
    Private key material (placeholder value)
    "privateKey": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …",
    placeholder
  • low Secrets in code secret-private-key scripts/generate-config.sh:133
    Private key material (placeholder value)
    "privateKey": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …",
    placeholder

Files scanned: 16. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (alipayplus-integration) differs from the folder (skill-alipayplus-integration)
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 79 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1812 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -218 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -32 of 5 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 363: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 79 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 7)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a genuine Alipay+ integration helper, but it handles payment credentials and transaction data with weak safety guardrails that users should review before use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026