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CC openclaw-backup-restore

This skill should be used when the user asks for OpenClaw backup, restore, rollback, validation, GitHub backup, off-machine backup, workspace recovery, or protection of OpenClaw state files and optional config backups.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: X-RayLuan v1.5.4 MIT-0 26 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 1 952 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 5 d ago

As a process C 50/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

AnalyzerGitHubInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
66
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
50/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 18

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 18
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell FINAL-DELIVERY-REPORT.md:168
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      3. **用户体验差距:** ClawLite 的 "one-click install" (`curl | bash`) 与 DMG 下载流程不同
      quoted
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell FINAL-DELIVERY-REPORT.md:173
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      2. **简单:** 当前 `curl | bash` 方法 50 行 shell 脚本，DMG 方法需 500+ 行
      quoted
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell FINAL-DELIVERY-REPORT.md:178
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - **主要分发:** 保持 `curl | bash` (开发者和 CLI 用户)
      quoted
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell FINAL-DELIVERY-REPORT.md:318
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - **忽略用户反馈:** 先发布 `curl | bash`，根据反馈迭代
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token DELIVERY_REPORT.md:96
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      node scripts/restore.mjs --timestamp pre-…-00
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention EXAMPLES.md:8
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (test fixture / example file)
      # Add to crontab: crontab -e
      fixture
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention EXAMPLES.md:79
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (test fixture / example file)
      # Add to crontab: crontab -e
      fixture
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token EXAMPLES.md:102
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (test fixture / example file)
      node scripts/restore.mjs --timestamp pre-…-00
      fixture
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention examples/automated-backup.sh:3
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (code comment; test fixture / example file)
      # Add to crontab: crontab -e
      commentfixture
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token FINAL-DELIVERY-REPORT.md:43
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      node scripts/restore.mjs --timestamp pre-…-00
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token P0-1-DELIVERY-REPORT.md:103
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      node scripts/restore.mjs --timestamp pre-…-00
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention P0-1-DELIVERY-REPORT.md:151
      Mentions editing / listing crontab
      # Add to crontab: crontab -e
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:141
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      node scripts/restore.mjs --timestamp pre-…-00
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention README.md:233
      Mentions editing / listing crontab
      # Add to crontab: crontab -e
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token RUNBOOK.md:105
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      node scripts/restore.mjs --timestamp pre-…-00
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention RUNBOOK.md:240
      Mentions editing / listing crontab
      # Add to crontab: crontab -e
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention RUNBOOK.md:256
      Mentions editing / listing crontab
      # Add to crontab: crontab -e
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:174
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      node scripts/restore.mjs --timestamp pre-…-00

    Files scanned: 25. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 50/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 11 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (openclaw-backup-restore) differs from the folder (openclaw-workspace-backup-restore)
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, git, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 45 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1952 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 218: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 29 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 45 items
    • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
    • +3All 5 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is a real backup/restore utility, but it has enough under-disclosed risk around sensitive config backups, remote Git pushes, and inconsistent paths that users should review it carefully before installing.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026