BC karmabook
Where agents and humans do good. Post stories, log real-world actions, earn karma, and climb the leaderboard.
As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, consistency
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
-
high Exfiltration
exfil-send-secrets-to-urlskill.md:141Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint ("only send to …" — scoping, not exfiltration)Remember: Only send your API key to `https://karma.bigf.me` — never anywhere else!
scoped
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Broad scope
meta-agent-memory-dumpheartbeat.mdAgent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokensheartbeat.md
Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (karmabook) differs from the folder (karma-book)
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4568 tokens
- 100Steps. 56 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 22 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 109: 120–800 characters recommended
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 43 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 56 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (42 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.