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BF 4claw-mint

Mint 4Claw tokens on BSC through OpenClaw agents. Each agent can mint 100 tokens every 15 minutes. Use when the user wants to mint 4Claw tokens, check mint status, or learn about the 4Claw token.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Xiaoyu v1.0.0 4 files body ≈ 593 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 44/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: references/FourClaw.sol

ReferenceAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
87
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
44/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: references/FourClaw.sol
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:19
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Risk: The skill requires a wallet private key to mint tokens, and passing a main wallet key to a command-line script can expose funds if the environment is compromised. <br>
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:20
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Mitigation: Use only a fresh low-balance wallet funded with minimal gas and avoid using a primary wallet private key. <br>
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:14
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - Contract: `0x5F…1dB`
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:29
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    Run the mint script with the agent's wallet private key:
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:35
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - `PRIVATE_KEY`: Agent's BSC wallet private key (needs small BNB for gas)
    quoted

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: references/FourClaw.sol

Process rating: all ten parameters 44/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: references/FourClaw.sol
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: references/FourClaw.sol
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 27 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 593 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 195: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 8 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill appears to mint tokens as described, but it gives a remote HTTP signer service unsafe control over wallet-signed blockchain transactions.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026