SKILLEMALL.ai
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BC share-agent

Use this skill when the user wants to share their AI agent with someone, generate a shareable link, require sign-in, allow anonymous access, let others talk to their agent, configure write access for guests, or manage existing shared links. Triggers on: 'share link', 'agent link', 'share my agent', 'let them talk to my AI', 'require sign-in', 'anonymous link', 'write access', 'edit access', 'guest permissions', or wanting to create a link for investors, prospects, partners, or anyone else to interact with their AI assistant.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Awassi v1.1.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 1 178 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 5 d ago

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, consistency, running it twice

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:26
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer ${AICOO_API_KEY:-$PULSE_API_KEY}" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:86
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer ${AICOO_API_KEY:-$PULSE_API_KEY}" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:107
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer ${AICOO_API_KEY:-$PULSE_API_KEY}" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:115
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer ${AICOO_API_KEY:-$PULSE_API_KEY}" \

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "user-invokable"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (share-agent) differs from the folder (aicoo-share-agent)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 15 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1178 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 530: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is not malware, but it gives an agent broad authority to publish Aicoo share links, expose visitor data, and edit remote note-backed policies with insufficient warnings.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 28 May 2026