SKILLEMALL.ai

BC check-messages

Use this skill when the user wants to see messages their Aicoo agent received, check what people asked, review conversation history, or see agent inbox activity. Triggers on: 'check messages', 'check my messages', 'what did my agent receive', 'who talked to my agent', 'agent inbox', 'show conversations', 'any new messages', 'what did people ask', 'agent activity', 'conversation history'.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Awassi v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 795 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting

AnalyzerAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:26
      Writes to a shell startup file
      CALLER_ID=$(echo "$IDENTITY" | jq -r '.profile.userId')
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:27
      Writes to a shell startup file
      USERNAME=$(echo "$IDENTITY" | jq -r '.profile.username')

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "user-invokable"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 13 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 795 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 390: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 10 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
    • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill does what it claims, but it can display private Aicoo messages and contact details from broad prompts without a built-in confirmation step.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 28 May 2026