SKILLEMALL.ai

BC skill-vetter-zh

安装任何 AI 智能体技能前的安全审查协议。检测凭据窃取、混淆代码、数据外泄等危险标志。风险分级:低危/中危/高危/极危。生成结构化审查报告。在未经审查的情况下,禁止安装任何来源不明的技能。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Xocio v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 1 254 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
81
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-encoded-exec SKILL.md:262
    Executes a base64/encoded payload (documentation of a security skill)
    eval $(echo "Y3Vy…zaA==" | base64 -d)
    security skill
Medium and low: 1

✓ Guard found no suspicious behaviour. 1 matches are attack strings quoted in this security skill's own documentation.

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "changelog"

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 38 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1254 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 95: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -214 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 22 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 38 items
  • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a markdown-only Chinese skill-review checklist with no executable code, persistence, hidden behavior, or unsupported sensitive access.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026