SKILLEMALL.ai

BB tiktok-research-kit

Extract and analyze TikTok content using yt-dlp. Supports video metadata, caption extraction, sound/music info, user profile analysis, and engagement stats. Use when user mentions "TikTok research", "TikTok extract", "TikTok analysis", "TikTok metadata", "analyze TikTok", or provides a tiktok.com/vm.tiktok.com URL.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: 江辰 v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 972 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 77/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, running it twice, progress reporting

AnalyzerMarketingtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
92
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
77/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:140
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    - TikTok may require cookies for some content: `--cookies-from-browser chrome`

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 77/100

  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 20 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 972 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 316: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 92.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill appears aimed at YouTube transcript extraction, but it includes under-scoped guidance around browser session cookies and an external download-service reference that users should review before installing.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026