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CB agentic-x402

Make x402 payments to access gated APIs and content. Fetch paid resources, check wallet balance, and create payment links. Use when encountering 402 Payment Required responses or when the user wants to pay for web resources with crypto.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Yahya v0.2.6 20 files body ≈ 2 266 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

GeneratorAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
66
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
70/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 18

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 18
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:217
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `EVM_PRIVATE_KEY` | Your wallet private key (0x-prefixed). Used to sign payment authorizations. |
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:20
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Risk: The skill can give an agent persistent access to a wallet private key and can trigger real-money crypto payments. <br>
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:249
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `EVM_PRIVATE_KEY` | Wallet private key (0x-prefixed) | **required** |
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:287
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Set your wallet private key:
    • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets config/example.env:8
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (test fixture / example file)
      # Your EVM wallet private key (with 0x prefix)
      fixture
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token pnpm-lock.yaml:43
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      resolution: {integrity: sha5…7pY+zoMV…h0x/Ptw8…8dg==}
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token pnpm-lock.yaml:55
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      resolution: {integrity: sha5…b00+Gxjx…zRc/oZwU…hzA==}
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token pnpm-lock.yaml:73
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      resolution: {integrity: sha512-vHk/hA7/1Ack…wbo+jaSh…Gtl+A5zq…HFg==}
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token pnpm-lock.yaml:85
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      resolution: {integrity: sha5…Dsc+j03S…0oA==}
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token pnpm-lock.yaml:187
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      resolution: {integrity: sha5…NS8+tHW7…WOF+PEzk…X4Q==}
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:290
      Reads a .env file
      cat ~/.x402/.env | grep EVM_PRIVATE_KEY
    • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/commands/setup.ts:130
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      console.log('Do you have an existing wallet private key?\n');
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/commands/setup.ts:208
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      # Your wallet private key (required)
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/core/config.ts:88
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      8453: '0x83…913',   // Base mainnet
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/core/config.ts:89
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      84532: '0x03…F7e', // Base Sepolia
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:268
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - Base Mainnet: `0x83…913`
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:269
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - Base Sepolia: `0x03…F7e`
      quoted
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:339
      Reads a .env file
      cat ~/.x402/.env | grep EVM_PRIVATE_KEY

    Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 12 mutating operations with no state check
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 39 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2266 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 236: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 35 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 39 items
    • +4Has examples (26 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is coherent for x402 crypto payments, but it gives an agent persistent wallet-key access and can trigger real-money payments with limited built-in safeguards.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026