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CD agent-p2p

(no description)

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Liyanan v0.9.3 MIT-0 25 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 1 512 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
50
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 11

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 11
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege auto_install.py:126
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    sudo rm -rf agent-p2p
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege auto_install.py:128
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    sudo chown -R ubuntu:ubuntu agent-p2p
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege auto_install.py:156
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "ADMIN_USER=$ADMIN_USER" | sudo tee /opt/agent-p2p/.env
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege auto_install.py:157
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "ADMIN_PASS=$ADMIN_PASS" | sudo tee -a /opt/agent-p2p/.env
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege auto_install.py:158
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    sudo chmod 600 /opt/agent-p2p/.env
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process auto_install.py:234
    Starts a background / autostarted process (string literal in code, not executed)
    sudo systemctl enable agent-p2p
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process README.md:151
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable agent-p2p
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/deploy_portal.py:314
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (code comment)
    # 先写入临时文件，再 sudo mv
    comment
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/deploy_portal.py:363
    Starts a background / autostarted process (string literal in code, not executed)
    self.run_command("systemctl enable certbot.timer", sudo=True)
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/deploy_portal.py:459
    Starts a background / autostarted process (string literal in code, not executed)
    self.run_command("systemctl enable agent-p2p", sudo=True)
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process setup.sh:100
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup venv/bin/python3 client.py > client.log 2>&1 &

Files scanned: 25. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Implicit map keys need to be followed by map values at line 4, column 1: **渠道标识：** 收到 `[Agent P2P]` 开头的消息，表示来自 Agent P2P 通信系统。 ^^^^^^^^^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 38 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1512 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -33 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 23 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 38 items
  • +4Has examples (22 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 50.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real P2P agent messaging skill, but it needs Review because it grants broad local and VPS control while handling secrets and public endpoints unsafely.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026