SKILLEMALL.ai

BD yby6-video-parser

此技能用于解析短视频链接,支持解析抖音、快手、B站等多个主流平台的短视频和图文链接,并能自动提取语音内容转录为文字。适用于需要批量获取视频元数据或将视频内容转为文本的场景时使用此 skill。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Yang Buyi v2.0.0 MIT-0 33 files body ≈ 1 128 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureMedia and videoInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: yby6-video-parser (ClawHub)

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Secrets in code
If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Secrets in code meta-credential-files .env
    Credential / dotenv files bundled with the skill (1)
    .env

Files scanned: 32. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "env"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "binaries"

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (yby6-video-parser) differs from the folder (yby6-video-parser-skill)
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 16 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1128 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 96: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 17 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill mostly does what it says, but it sends video-derived audio to a hardcoded external transcription API and accepts broadly supplied URLs with limited network scoping.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026