SKILLEMALL.ai

AC skillguard-check

Audit every locally-installed AI Skill against skill-guard's public security database (skillguard.vip). Use when (1) the user asks 'are my skills safe?' or 'check my skills', (2) the user just installed a new skill from ClawHub / OpenClaw / a marketplace, (3) before invoking an unfamiliar skill, (4) on a periodic security check. Surfaces blocked skills (hard-trigger rules fired) and high-risk skills (score < 50).

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Yangyi v1.0.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 1 040 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerInfrastructureCommercetype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Bash Read

    A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 16 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1040 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 416: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 6 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
    • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a disclosed local skill-audit helper that sends installed skill names to skillguard.vip, with no evidence of hidden persistence, credential access, or destructive behavior.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026