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BC scout

Agent trust intelligence for Moltbook and x402 Bazaar. Use when you need to check if an agent or service is trustworthy before paying, compare agents side-by-side, scan feeds for quality agents, or make trust-gated USDC payments. Answers the question "should I pay this agent?" with research-backed scoring across 6 dimensions.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Operon v1.0.2 22 files body ≈ 731 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 10

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 10
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:46
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…wQp+7C4n…9JQ==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:64
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…jgR+Mkmf+D189…ihQ==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:179
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…hAG+OAW+HQPZ6n++TNDUX+L0+uUlL…1Zm+zTCj…9vK/Q==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:233
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…jiu+MWhy…KK0/Cjtr…D82/mCWb…AEQ==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/api-server.js:51
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      const SCOUT_WALLET = '0xc3…B25';
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/lib/onchain.js:39
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      'base-sepolia': '0x03…F7e',
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/lib/onchain.js:40
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      'base': '0x83…913',
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/lib/onchain.js:41
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      'ethereum': '0xA0…B48',
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/lib/usdc.js:10
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      const USDC_ADDRESS = '0x03…F7e'; // Circle's testnet USDC on Base Sepolia
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/safe-pay.js:66
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      SCOUT_PRIVATE_KEY   Wallet private key for sending USDC (optional for dry-run)
      quoted

    Files scanned: 22. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 15 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 731 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -34 of 9 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 327: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 16 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is not clearly malicious, but it combines trust scoring, wallet payments, API-key-backed services, and automatic DM replies with unsafe or under-disclosed behavior.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026