SKILLEMALL.ai

BD magneto-skill-master

本技能用于从 GitHub / Gitee 等仓库安全下载、审计并安装外部 Agent Skill(尤其标书、招投标、文档生成、自动化类技能)到本机用户级技能目录,使其可被 WorkBuddy 直接触发使用。当用户要求"从 GitHub 下载技能""安装/补装某某 skill""帮我装个标书技能""把 Gitee 上的 XX 技能拿下来""获取并适配外部技能""给 WorkBuddy 加个技能"时触发。Also triggers on: install skill, download skill from github, add a skill to workbuddy, fetch external agent skill. 覆盖仓库定位、安全审计(P0/P1/P2 分级)、WorkBuddy 格式适配(受管 venv、run_script.sh 包装器、中文乱码修复)、依赖安装与验证全流程。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: yehuzi2026 v1.0.0 MIT-0 7 files · 1 script body ≈ 830 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

本技能用于从 GitHub / Gitee 等仓库安全下载、审计并安装外部 Agent Skill(尤其标书、招投标、文档生成、自动化类技能)到本机用户级技能目录,使其可被 WorkBuddy 直接触发使用。当用户要求"从 GitHub 下载技能""安装/补装某某 skill""帮我装个标书技能""把 Gitee…

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ProcedureGitHubProcurementAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 0

✓ No critical or high findings

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: 本技能用于从 GitHub / Gitee 等仓库安全下载、审计并安装外部 Agent Skill(尤其标书、招投标、文档生成、自动… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "agent_created"

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, git, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 44 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 830 tokens
  • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 6 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 403: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 44 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is transparently meant to install external skills, but it can download third-party code, overwrite local skill folders, install dependencies, and even suggests disabling sandboxing without a clear confirmation gate for every system-changing step.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 29 Jul 2026