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CF article-archiver

Automatically archive web articles and Twitter Articles to Feishu documents. ALWAYS trigger when user shares URLs from x.com (Twitter), mp.weixin.qq.com (WeChat articles), or says "保存/记录/收藏 [链接]". Handles long articles (600+ lines), multiple images (20+ images), preserves formatting (bold, code blocks, lists), and sends success notification to user. Use immediately when detecting article URLs, don't ask for confirmation.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: yemoo v1.0.0 MIT-0 41 files · 8 scripts body ≈ 5 301 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 43/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: url, image_url

AnalyzerWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
60
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
43/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: url, image_url
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 10

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 10
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token config/twitter-cookies.txt:1
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    auth_token=170c…988; ct0=7659…e80
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token scripts/archive-long-article.js:17
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    app_secret: 'gdEs…Vtg'
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:26
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…uWm+fFRcIOgKBMiOBP+eXiy…9ab+DDKA==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/archive-long-article-v2.py:62
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    -d '{{"app_id":"cli_…bcb","app_secret":"gdEs…Vtg"}}' | jq -r '.tenant_access_token')
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/archive-long-article.js:17
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    app_secret: 'gdEs…Vtg'
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/archive-long-article.py:18
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    'app_secret': 'gdEs…Vtg'
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/archive-simple.py:27
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    -d '{"app_id":"cli_…bcb","app_secret":"gdEs…Vtg"}' | jq -r '.tenant_access_token'
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/fetch-twitter-article.js:13
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox']
    detectorcode literal
  • low Secrets in code secret-labelled-token test_image_insert.py:6
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (test fixture / example file)
    APP_SECRET = "gdEs…Vtg"
    fixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token test_image_insert.py:6
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    APP_SECRET = "gdEs…Vtg"
    fixturequoted

Files scanned: 40. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5301 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: url
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: image_url

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: url, image_url
  • 0Tools and files. 2 referenced file(s) missing: url, image_url
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5301 tokens
  • 100Steps. 161 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • medium 4 test cases, all positive: not one "should refuse" or "should ask first"
  • low No test case covers injection arriving through data

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -223 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -325 of 30 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 424: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 54 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 161 items
  • +4Has examples (45 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 60.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This archiver mostly does what it says, but it automatically sends shared content to fixed Feishu resources while bundling sensitive credentials and unsafe shell-based helpers.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026