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CC ai-agent-runtime

A lightweight AI Agent runtime tool that provides an integrated web management interface, supports multiple LLM providers, and is fully compatible with OpenClaw's skill ecosystem.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: yesong-Hue v1.2.0 MIT-0 6 files · 1 script body ≈ 172 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
66/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
67
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 9
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:85
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fastclaw-ai/fastclaw/main/install.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege README.md:105
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv fastclaw /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege README.md:109
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv fastclaw /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege README.md:254
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm /usr/local/bin/fastclaw
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:268
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fastclaw-ai/fastclaw/main/install.sh | bash
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump templates/SOUL.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    templates/SOUL.md
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host scripts/install.sh:4
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (code comment)
    # curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fastclaw-ai/fastclaw/main/install.sh | bash
    comment
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/install.sh:61
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "  sudo mv ${INSTALL_DIR}/fastclaw /usr/local/bin/fastclaw"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/install.sh:70
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "  sudo mv ${INSTALL_DIR}/fastclaw /usr/local/bin/fastclaw"
    code literal

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "readme"

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 8 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 172 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 179: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 4 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real AI agent runtime, but it uses under-scoped install and data-handling guidance for credentials, local web access, and persistent memory.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026