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CB ourmem

Shared memory that never forgets. Cloud hosted or self-deployed. Collective intelligence for AI agents with Space-based sharing across agents and teams. Use when users say: - "install ourmem" / "install omem" - "setup memory" / "setup omem" - "add memory plugin" - "ourmem onboarding" / "omem onboarding" - "memory not working" - "remember this" - "save this for later" - "don't forget" - "recall preferences" - "what did I say last time" - "import memories" - "share memories" - "share with user" - "share memories to someone" - "team memory" - "shared space" - "persistent memory" - "cross-session memory" - "collective intelligence" - "memory analytics" - "memory stats" - "self-host memory" - "deploy memory server" Even if the user doesn't say "ourmem" or "omem", trigger when they want persistent memory, memory sharing between agents, memory analytics, or memory import/export.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: yhyyz v1.1.1 MIT-0 6 files · 1 script body ≈ 3 136 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureInfrastructureAI and agentsData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
66/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
52
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 12

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 12
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/api-quick-ref.md:33
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s "$API_URL/v1/memories/search?q=dark+mode&limit=5" -H "X-API-Key: $KEY"
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/api-quick-ref.md:36
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s "$API_URL/v1/memories/search?q=architecture&space=all" -H "X-API-Key: $KEY"
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/api-quick-ref.md:39
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s "$API_URL/v1/memories?category=preferences&tier=core&limit=20" -H "X-API-Key: $KEY"
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/api-quick-ref.md:42
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s $API_URL/v1/memories/MEMORY_ID -H "X-API-Key: $KEY"
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/api-quick-ref.md:50
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -sX DELETE $API_URL/v1/memories/MEMORY_ID -H "X-API-Key: $KEY"
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/verify.sh:56
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      AUTH=$(curl -sf -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" "$API_URL/v1/memories?limit=1" 2>/dev/null && echo "OK" || echo "FAIL")
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:267
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -sX POST "$API_URL/v1/imports" -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:271
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -sX POST "$API_URL/v1/imports" -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:275
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s "$API_URL/v1/imports/IMPORT_ID" -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY"
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv references/selfhost-setup.md:38
      Reads a .env file
      cp .env.example .env
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:149
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - **Existing key** → Verify: `curl -sf -H "X-API-Key: $KEY" "$API_URL/v1/memories?limit=1"`, then skip to plugin install
      quoted
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:282
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      **Cross-reconcile** (discover relations): `curl -sX POST "$API_URL/v1/imports/cross-reconcile" -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY"`
      quoted

    Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "keywords"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 16 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 85Steps. 31 steps, 2 vague phrases
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3136 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +3Description length 886: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 27 example trigger phrases
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +4Structure: 20 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 31 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a coherent shared-memory skill, but it asks agents to persist and share sensitive memories, upload local memory files, and store long-lived API keys with limited safeguards.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 28 May 2026