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BC openclaw-security-checklist

OpenClaw 部署前安全检查清单。聚焦合规导向的部署前检查（非事后加固），覆盖防火墙、SSH、API 密钥管理、数据出境合规、多部署场景验证。使用清单式检查，可逐项打勾并生成报告。适用于个人 Mac、VPS、Docker、企业部署场景。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: yiyuanlu v1.0.0 MIT-0 14 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 840 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationDockerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
77
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 11

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 11
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/deployment-scenarios/enterprise.md:142
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    echo "0 0 1 * * certbot renew --quiet" | crontab -
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention README.md:230
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
    # crontab -e
    security skill
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal references/api-key-management.md:72
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)
    const apiKey = "sk-1…def";
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/api-key-management.md:158
    Writes to a shell startup file (documentation of a security skill)
    echo "export OPENCLAW_API_KEY=$NEW_KEY" >> ~/.zshrc
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/deployment-scenarios/docker.md:63
    Writes to a shell startup file (documentation of a security skill)
    echo "export DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1" >> ~/.bashrc
    security skill
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal references/deployment-scenarios/docker.md:267
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)
    ENV API_KEY=sk-1…890
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention references/deployment-scenarios/docker.md:361
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
    # crontab -e
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/deployment-scenarios/vps.md:103
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo systemctl enable firewalld
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/deployment-scenarios/vps.md:114
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo cp /etc/fail2ban/jail.conf /etc/fail2ban/jail.local
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/deployment-scenarios/vps.md:115
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo systemctl enable fail2ban
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/deployment-scenarios/vps.md:127
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo systemctl enable yum-cron
    security skill

Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 47 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 840 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -220 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 120: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 22 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 47 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This looks like a legitimate security checklist, but it needs Review because it can print local secret matches into reports and contacts a third-party IP lookup service by default.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026