SKILLEMALL.ai

CD claude-anywhere

不是聊天机器人,是你口袋里的AI员工。Claude Anywhere 让你通过 Telegram、企业微信、QQ 随时随地读写文件、执行命令、分析图片、管理代码。Not a chatbot — your AI engineer in your pocket. Claude Anywhere lets you read/write files, execute commands, analyze images, manage code — from Telegram, WeChat Work, or QQ, anywhere.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: yizhao1978 v1.6.2 MIT-0 15 files · 1 script body ≈ 453 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerTelegramAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
77
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 19

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 19
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege README.md:271
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp systemd/claude-anywhere.service /etc/systemd/system/
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv bridge-telegram.mjs:36
    Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.error("ERROR: TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN is not set. Copy .env.example to .env and fill in the token.");
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv index.html:705
    Reads a .env file
    <code>cp .env.example .env</code><br>
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv index.html:739
    Reads a .env file
    <code>cp .env.example .env</code><br>
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv index.html:773
    Reads a .env file
    <code>cp .env.example .env</code><br>
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv install.sh:7
    Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "1. cp .env.example .env"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:142
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…GBE+Xw7U+pHMY…0q5/TER/tYh3PQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:170
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…HxH+tv3k…kSo+8o0wxg9lZWw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:186
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…9dM/mwVgvbZJaSNaRk+bshk…Kbz+IoId…W0Q=="
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:236
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Wbq+zHns…i0d//cwIw…jdV+vww==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:245
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…dfW+r2Wn…xUV+azxA…TQk+2N2X…Rtg=="
    detector
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:30
    Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    2. `git clone https://github.com/yizhao1978/claude-anywhere.git && cd claude-anywhere && npm install && cp .env.example .env`
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:35
    Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    2. `git clone https://github.com/yizhao1978/claude-anywhere.git && cd claude-anywhere && npm install && cp .env.example .env`
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:40
    Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    2. `git clone https://github.com/yizhao1978/claude-anywhere.git && cd claude-anywhere && npm install && cp .env.example .env`
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:184
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process README.md:278
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable claude-anywhere
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:36
    Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    2. `git clone https://github.com/yizhao1978/claude-anywhere.git && cd claude-anywhere && npm install && cp .env.example .env`
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:41
    Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    2. `git clone https://github.com/yizhao1978/claude-anywhere.git && cd claude-anywhere && npm install && cp .env.example .env`
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:46
    Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    2. `git clone https://github.com/yizhao1978/claude-anywhere.git && cd claude-anywhere && npm install && cp .env.example .env`
    quoted

Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (git, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 25 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 453 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 265: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 9 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a disclosed remote Claude Code bridge, but it gives messaging users broad local file and command authority with weak scoping and persistence controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026