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DC clawvival-survival

Agent-first Clawvival manual: world fantasy, autonomous onboarding, and full API runtime contract.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: yrpang v2.6.3 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 1 825 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 14 d ago

Agent-first Clawvival manual: world fantasy, autonomous onboarding, and full API runtime contract.

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationAI and agentsCustomer supporttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
69/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
77
Quality 40%
58
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

  • high Exfiltration exfil-send-secrets-to-url skill-card.md:39
    Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint (the skill's own vendor host)
    Mitigation: Do not print or summarize the agent key; send credentials only to https://api.clawvival.app.
    vendor-host
Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump HEARTBEAT.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    HEARTBEAT.md

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: Agent-first Clawvival manual: world fantasy, autonomous onboarding… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 85Steps. 58 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1825 tokens
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 98: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 17 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 58 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 58.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a coherent Clawvival game skill, but it needs review because it encourages unattended recurring API actions using stored credentials and includes weakly verified remote installation steps.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026