SKILLEMALL.ai

DC gkn-phantom

GKN-Phantom — production-grade automated penetration testing and security validation skill. v5.3 completes the Quick Combat impact chain: quick detect (nuclei + built-in probes) → content-aware severity escalation (v5.2) → deep-dive adapters proving impact from exposed content (Actuator/GraphQL/Swagger, v5.3 C1) → parameter discovery with bounded error-based SQLi/SSTI probing (v5.3 C2) → auto PoC generation → auto exploit generation → bundled combat report. Retains v5 capabilities including interactive browser agent (Playwright), HTML/PDF visualization reports, YAML rule configuration with hot-reload, and full pytest test suite (30+ modules, 38 vulnerability types, 25+ WAF fingerprints, 20+ attack chain patterns). Trigger phrases include penetration test, pentest, security audit, vulnerability scan, security validation, and their Chinese equivalents.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Tiwing08-root v0.1.0 MIT-0 64 files · 43 scripts body ≈ 12 159 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 6 d ago

GKN-Phantom — production-grade automated penetration testing and security validation skill.

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, execution cost

AnalyzerPlaywrightGitHubSecurityData and analyticsAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
78
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Execution cost w 6
40
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 18

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 18
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key scripts/passive_recon.py:1060
    Private key material (key header without key body; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    ("Private keys", '"{domain}" -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
    header onlyquoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README.md:3
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    > **Production-grade automated penetration testing skill for the OpenClaw AI Agent Framework.**
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc README.md:243
    Writes to a shell startup file (documentation of a security skill)
    echo 'export PATH=$PATH:$HOME/go/bin' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc
    security skill
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README.md:259
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    user: "Run a penetration test on dev-internal.test"
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/data_schemas.md:1
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    # Data Schemas — GKN-Phantom Penetration Testing Skill
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/payload_playbook.md:11
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    3. L4 actions (write methods, internal SSRF sinks, privilege escalation)
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/payload_playbook.md:304
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    ### Privilege Escalation (`priv_esc`)
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/safety_policy.md:1
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    # Safety Policy — GKN-Phantom Penetration Testing Skill
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/safety_policy.md:64
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    that mutates server state), privilege escalation attempts, SSRF to internal
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/cloud_security.py:92
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "headers": {"X-aw…nds": "21600"},
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/nuclei_runner.py:379
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    "unzip nuclei.zip && chmod +x nuclei && sudo mv nuclei /usr/local/bin/",
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic scripts/waf_evasion.py:347
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input (detector / deny-list definition)
    "description": "Wrap in eval(atob(<base64>)) to hide payload",
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic scripts/waf_evasion.py:348
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "generator": lambda p: f"eval(atob('{_bas…rap(p)}'))",
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:4
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    description: GKN-Phantom — production-grade automated penetration testing and security validation skill. v5.3 completes the Quick Combat impact chain: quick detect (nuclei + built-in probes) → content
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:7
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    # GKN-Phantom — Penetration Testing Skill
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:11
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    Execute automated, authorized penetration testing and security validation in
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:84
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - A user requests a penetration test, security audit, or vulnerability scan of
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:479
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    metadata, SQLi→credential dumping, IDOR→mass PII exposure, SSTI→RCE,

Files scanned: 54. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 3, column 14: description: GKN-Phantom — production-grade automated penetration testing and s… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 12159 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 12159 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Steps. 150 steps, 5 vague phrases
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +3Description length 862: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +4Structure: 26 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 150 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (6 of 6)
  • +3All 34 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a powerful penetration-testing skill with real exploit generation and weak runtime guard enforcement in its quick-run path, so it needs manual review before use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 18 Sept 2026