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BC x402-card

Use this skill when the user wants to purchase a virtual debit card using crypto, create a prepaid card via x402 protocol, check virtual card status, or set up an EVM wallet for card payments. Trigger on: "buy a card", "get a virtual card", "create card", "card status", "setup wallet for card", or any intent involving purchasing virtual Visa/Mastercard with cryptocurrency.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: yuanyongm v1.0.0 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 1 190 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

GeneratorInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
83
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/wallet-setup.md:5
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      - An EVM wallet private key
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:20
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Risk: The skill asks for and persists a full EVM wallet private key. <br>
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:34
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      # First time: provide your EVM wallet private key (service URL has a built-in default)
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/x402-protocol.md:32
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "tokenAddress": "0x55…955",
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:86
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      > "Please provide your EVM wallet private key (BSC network). It will be stored locally at ~/.x402-card/config.json with restricted file permissions and never transmitted elsewhere."
      quoted

    Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "emoji"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 26 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1190 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 375: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill does what it claims, but it asks for and persists a full crypto wallet private key while relying on an unpinned external CLI that can auto-upgrade.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026