SKILLEMALL.ai

AB gmail-auto-draft

Monitor Gmail inbox, read incoming emails, generate personalized follow-up replies with OpenAI, and save replies into Gmail Drafts for human review. Use when the user wants Gmail auto-monitoring, AI-assisted client email responses, draft-before-send workflows, or agency inbox automation.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: yuliuyi717-ux v1.0.0 MIT-0 12 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 630 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, failures and branches, running it twice

GeneratorGmailInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
92
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/gmail_auto_draft.py:331
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment

    Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 30 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 630 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 288: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 6 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 3)
    • +3All 3 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 92.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This Gmail drafting skill is coherent, but it needs review because it can continuously read private email, send message content to an AI endpoint, and modify mailbox state.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026