SKILLEMALL.ai

CC knowledge-acquisition

知识获取:多平台内容解析(小红书/微信/网站等)、8类分类、Markdown 笔记生成、可选飞书云盘归档

ClawHub Agent Skills author: yz6214589-hash v2.0.1 MIT-0 33 files body ≈ 71 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
70/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
43
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence README.md:30
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    如果你用 `openclaw gateway start`(LaunchAgent)方式启动网关,需要把这些环境变量写入 LaunchAgent 环境(否则网关进程读不到你终端的 export)。常见做法是在 `~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist` 中增加 `EnvironmentVariables`,然后执行 `openclaw ga
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege index-original.js:302
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox']
    detectorcode literal
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:283
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…ywo+qwL+oL8H…C1U+vRfLQDvw==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:299
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-Yqfm+XDx0+Prh3…1yC+JWZ2…IL7+vK+Clp7…D7g==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:312
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…xZl+RoGR…fbT/ZgrF…0EA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:325
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…3bJ+V0If…IXN+CL65…a4w==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:341
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…H47+FFon…OsV/4+RRsz…0ig==",
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege plugins/core/content-extractor.js:98
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    args: ["--no-sandbox", "--disable-setuid-sandbox"],
    detectorcode literal

Files scanned: 33. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 7 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 71 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 52: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +4Structure: 2 headings, hard to scan
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • -15SKILL.md body under 300 characters: nearly empty
  • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 7 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 43.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill mostly matches a knowledge-capture workflow, but it can automatically upload extracted notes to Feishu and make them open to anyone with the link when credentials are configured.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026