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CC memory-engine

Memory guardian for OpenClaw — three-layer anti-amnesia with capacity management. v6.0: MEMORY.md soft cap (5000 chars) + USER.md cap (1500 chars) prevent prompt explosion. Auto-snapshot before compaction/GC. Integrity monitoring restores from snapshot if MEMORY.md is wiped. Works alongside OpenClaw native memorySearch (vector+hybrid) when available, falls back to built-in FTS5 when not. Focuses on what native lacks: auto-write, session extraction, watcher daemon, GC, health checks, backup, capacity management. Layer 1 (system): cron every 1h + watcher detects resets <30s + integrity checks. Layer 2 (platform): memory-flush + session-memory hook. Layer 3 (agent): write/search/maintain/boot scripts. Use when: recalling past conversations, writing memory entries, checking memory health, maintaining search index. Triggers: 'remember', 'recall', 'what did we discuss', 'memory status', 'search memory', 'reindex'.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: ZackO2o v6.0.0 MIT-0 18 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 3 776 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, consistency

AnalyzerAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
71
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 13

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 13
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence README.md:88
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "0 * * * * $(pwd)/scripts/memory-cron.sh") | crontab -
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/memory-cron.sh:3
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (code comment)
      # Install: (crontab -l; echo "0 * * * * /path/to/memory-cron.sh") | crontab -
      comment
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:100
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "0 * * * * $(pwd)/scripts/memory-cron.sh") | crontab -
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:116
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "0 * * * * $(pwd)/scripts/memory-cron.sh") | crontab -
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention README.md:88
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
      (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "0 * * * * $(pwd)/scripts/memory-cron.sh") | crontab -
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/memory-backup.sh:21
      Mentions editing / listing crontab
      crontab -l > "$WORKSPACE/crontab.backup" 2>/dev/null || true
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/memory-cron.sh:3
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (code comment)
      # Install: (crontab -l; echo "0 * * * * /path/to/memory-cron.sh") | crontab -
      comment
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/memory-cron.sh:142
      Starts a background / autostarted process
      nohup bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/memory-watcher.sh" >> "$WORKSPACE/.memory/watcher.log" 2>&1 &
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/memory-migrate.js:159
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      const crontab = require('child_process').execSync('crontab -l', { encoding: 'utf8' });
      quoted
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/memory-migrate.js:205
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      const crontab = execSync('crontab -l', { encoding: 'utf8' });
      quoted
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/memory-watcher.sh:6
      Starts a background / autostarted process (code comment)
      # Usage: nohup bash memory-watcher.sh &
      comment
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:100
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
      (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "0 * * * * $(pwd)/scripts/memory-cron.sh") | crontab -
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:116
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
      (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "0 * * * * $(pwd)/scripts/memory-cron.sh") | crontab -
      security skill

    Files scanned: 18. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (memory-engine) differs from the folder (memory-engine-3layer)
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 42 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3776 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 921: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -223 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • -31 of 14 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 32 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 42 items
    • +4Has examples (20 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This memory skill is useful and mostly disclosed, but it asks for unusually broad backup, restore, and background authority that can move private memory and configuration data to GitHub and restore scheduled tasks.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026