SKILLEMALL.ai

BB hume-x

X/Twitter CLI and SDK for reading, searching, posting, and engagement via cookie auth.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: zeroptis v1.0.0 2 files body ≈ 817 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:18
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    4. Browser cookies: Firefox (preferred) or Chrome

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Steps. 16 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 817 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 17 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 86: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 18 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a coherent X/Twitter automation wrapper, but it asks agents to use browser session cookies and can post, delete, and change account relationships without clear guardrails.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026