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DD huo15-searxng

SearXNG 自托管搜索引擎一键部署 - Docker Compose + OpenClaw 配置自动化 (v1.2.1)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Job Zhao v1.2.2 MIT-0 8 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 190 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorDockerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
53/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
45
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 11

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 11
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell README.md:148
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
    curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh
    vendor-host
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/install.sh:261
    Writes to a shell startup file
    sed -i '' "s|export SEARXNG_BASE_URL=.*|${env_line}|" "$HOME/.zshrc"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/install.sh:263
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "" >> "$HOME/.zshrc"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/install.sh:264
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "# SearXNG (huo1…xng)" >> "$HOME/.zshrc"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/install.sh:265
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "$env_line" >> "$HOME/.zshrc"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/install.sh:295
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "  ⚠️  如需立即生效，请运行: source ~/.zshrc"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/status.sh:67
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo -e "   ${YELLOW}⚠️  如未生效请运行: source ~/.zshrc${NC}"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/uninstall.sh:43
    Writes to a shell startup file
    sed -i '' '/# SearXNG.*huo1…xng/d' "$HOME/.zshrc"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/uninstall.sh:44
    Writes to a shell startup file
    sed -i '' '/export SEARXNG_BASE_URL=/d' "$HOME/.zshrc"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/uninstall.sh:58
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "    - ~/.zshrc 中的 SEARXNG_BASE_URL"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/uninstall.sh:61
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "     source ~/.zshrc"

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 16 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 190 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 62: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 7 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill appears to deploy SearXNG as advertised, but it makes persistent Docker and shell-profile changes that users should review first.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026