SKILLEMALL.ai

BD memory-bench

AI 说"我记得",你敢信吗?测一下就知道。长期记忆评测台 memory-bench——本地一键评测智能体/大模型长期记忆:12 类题型(时序/实体/否定/反事实/跨会话整合),EM/F1 标准评分,零配置开箱即跑;可接真实 LLM 严评(SiliconFlow/DeepSeek),密钥 env 注入不落盘。结果可复现、可对比、可入发布证据。自带安全稳定性 10 维实测全 5.0。适合 Agent 开发者、AI 产品经理、记忆方案选型。"记忆好不好,测了才知道。"

ClawHub Hermes author: zhaoxinghua09-cell v1.0.1 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 1 265 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

AI 说"我记得",你敢信吗?测一下就知道。长期记忆评测台 memory-bench——本地一键评测智能体/大模型长期记忆:12 类题型(时序/实体/否定/反事实/跨会话整合),EM/F1 标准评分,零配置开箱即跑;可接真实 LLM 严评(SiliconFlow/DeepSeek),密钥 env…

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. For Hermes the description must be one sentence under 60 characters; move the conditions to a "When to Use" section.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key tools/memory_bench.py:60
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell 安全审计报告.md:52
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    ✅ 不适用——本包不存在自动下载并执行远程脚本的行为(无 `curl | bash` 等模式)。
    quoted

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-long-hermes description is 234 chars; the Hermes authoring standard requires ≤ 60 (one sentence, ending with a period)
  • warning description-no-when neither description nor a "## When to Use" section says when to use the skill
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "display_name"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "description_en"

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 21 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1265 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 234: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 15 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The main benchmark is coherent, but a self-test advertised as local can use existing API keys and contact an external model service without a separate opt-in.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 26 Aug 2026