SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

DD crypto-sniper-bot

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: zhdryanchang v1.2.0 24 files body ≈ 1 519 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 39/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationCommerceInfrastructureFinancetype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
44/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
74
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
39/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 18

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 18
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets START_HERE.txt:16
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    # Your Solana wallet private key (base58 encoded)
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets START_HERE.txt:123
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - Check wallet private key is valid
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url API_SETUP.md:108
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL=https://discord.com/api/webhooks/xxxxx/xxxxx
    placeholder
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:61
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…4wC+Keca…vc6/fddvw/6lg9…Dt9+DkIvjXImQQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:70
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…7KL+OVwF…Elx+TiI1/6kcmcEe+g5YR…OvQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:108
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…p7K+vRNE…9hg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:158
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…p7K+vRNE…9hg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:327
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…oJ7+bcFA…ixm+5mH4…Qya/9Bmf…tYQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/monitors/fourMemeMonitor.js:11
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    this.fourMemeContract = '0xF0…5e5'; // Four.meme factory contract
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/monitors/pumpFunMonitor.js:45
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    is: "6EF8…F6P"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal src/trading/tradingEngine.js:30
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    const secretKey = bs58.decode(privateKey);
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/trading/tradingEngine.js:81
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    'So11…112', // SOL mint
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/trading/tradingEngine.js:230
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    'So11…112', // SOL mint
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/trading/tradingEngine.js:269
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    'So11…112',
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/utils/sniperBot.js:29
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    return { success: false, message: 'Wallet private key not configured' };
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token test-api.js:47
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    'So11…112', // SOL
    fixturequoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token test-api.js:48
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    'EPjF…t1v', // USDC
    fixturequoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets test.js:65
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.log('⚠️  Make sure to configure your wallet private key first!');
    fixturequoted

Files scanned: 24. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 39/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 85Steps. 98 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1519 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -215 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 38 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 98 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This crypto trading skill is coherent in purpose, but it has serious Review concerns because wallet secrets and live trading controls are exposed through weak authorization and plaintext storage.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: malicious · 11 Sept 2026