SKILLEMALL.ai

DD wechat-publish

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: zhuchenggong19851114-design v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 1 404 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 44/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
42/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
70
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
44/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 10

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 10
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:154
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/material/add_material?access_token=…&type=image" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:158
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/material/add_material?access_token=…&type=image" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:166
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/material/add_material?access_token=…&type=thumb" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:192
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/draft/add?access_token=…" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:203
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/freepublish/submit?access_token=…" \
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:154
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/material/add_material?access_token=…&type=image" \
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:158
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/material/add_material?access_token=…&type=image" \
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:166
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/material/add_material?access_token=…&type=thumb" \
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:192
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/draft/add?access_token=…" \
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:203
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/freepublish/submit?access_token=…" \
    placeholder

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 44/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 23 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1404 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -218 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 27 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
  • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is a coherent WeChat publishing workflow, but it gives an agent credential-backed authority to upload permanent materials and publish public content without clear approval or rollback boundaries.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026