SKILLEMALL.ai

BC create-leader

Create a leader AI skill, distill leadership style from workplace data, simulate leader decision-making, provide upward management advice, plan career advancement paths, help understand how to replace a leader, analyze leader weaknesses, build leadership capabilities, career strategy, promotion planning, boss simulation, manager skill creation, leadership analysis, upward communication guidance, career development, workplace strategy | 创建领导AI技能,从职场数据中蒸馏领导风格,模拟领导决策,提供向上管理建议,规划职业发展路径,帮助理解如何取代领导,分析领导弱点,构建领导能力,职业策略,晋升规划,老板模拟,经理技能创建,领导力分析,向上沟通指导,职业发展,职场策略,怎么和领导相处,怎么搞定老板,如何替代领导,怎么取代上级,领导模拟器,老板模拟器,创建领导skill,领导skill生成器,向上管理助手,取代路径规划

ClawHub Agent Skills author: zhuqingsonga v1.0.1 MIT-0 17 files body ≈ 3 769 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

GeneratorInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash

Files scanned: 17. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 18 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (create-leader) differs from the folder (leader-skill)
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 188 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3769 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 632: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 34 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 188 items
  • +4Has examples (20 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is not clearly malicious, but it needs review because it can collect and store sensitive workplace chats/documents while profiling a leader’s weaknesses and replacement path.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026