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CB multi-source-feed

Set up and manage an AI-curated daily tech brief from customizable sources. Use when user says "set up multi-source-feed", "configure my daily brief", or "msf setup".

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: zidooong v1.0.1 MIT-0 30 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 563 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
69/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
56
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
70/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Tools and files w 18
60
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 10

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:57
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    This script connects to the already-open Chrome instance via CDP (Chrome DevTools Protocol) on port 9222, extracts the session/cookies, and saves them to `x_session.json` in the project root. It does
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:87
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "0 9 * * * cd ~/multi-source-feed && .venv/bin/python3 -m src.pipeline >> /tmp/msf-scrape.log 2>&1") | crontab -
Medium and low: 8
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:42
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention README.md:85
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:161
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention README.md:204
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:35
    Reads a .env file (detector / deny-list definition)
    Once the user provides both keys, write them to `~/multi-source-feed/.env`:
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:87
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "0 9 * * * cd ~/multi-source-feed && .venv/bin/python3 -m src.pipeline >> /tmp/msf-scrape.log 2>&1") | crontab -
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:116
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:126
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e

Files scanned: 28. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 85Steps. 13 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 7 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1563 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 166: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a plausible daily-brief skill, but it stores a reusable X/Twitter login session and sets up recurring scraping with weak safety controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026