SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

FC personal-work-assistant

个人工作助理：每日自动聚合 Teambition 执行中任务、钉钉重点群聊讨论、@我、@所有人及 1对1 私聊消息，通过持久化任务账本长线追踪未完成事项，输出极简、行动导向的每日晨报并推送到钉钉。

Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: azusa v1.0.0 MIT-0 13 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 442 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

个人工作助理：每日自动聚合 Teambition 执行中任务、钉钉重点群聊讨论、@我、@所有人及 1对1 私聊消息，通过持久化任务账本长线追踪未完成事项，输出极简、行动导向的每日晨报并推送到钉钉。

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedurePersonal productivityAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
35/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
10
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Secrets in code
If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • critical Secrets in code secret-openai-key core/analyzer/task_analyzer.py:16
    OpenAI-style API key (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    api_key = "sk-x…MsD"
    quoted
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup_cron.sh:14
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "$CRON_JOB") | crontab -
Medium and low: 4
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token core/analyzer/task_analyzer.py:16
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    api_key = "sk-x…MsD"
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal core/analyzer/task_analyzer.py:16
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    api_key = "sk-x…MsD"
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/setup_cron.sh:11
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    if crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -Fq "$SCRIPT_PATH"; then
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/setup_cron.sh:14
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "$CRON_JOB") | crontab -

Files scanned: 13. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 13 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 442 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 98: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 7 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a work-reporting assistant, but it collects private workplace messages and sends them to a hardcoded external AI endpoint with bundled credentials and weak user controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 18 Aug 2026