CC chat-image-reader
First universal image reader for 10+ chat platforms. Features: (1) Auto platform detection (Feishu, DingTalk, WeChat, Discord, Telegram, WhatsApp, Slack, Signal, LINE, iMessage), (2) Unified API with platform-specific download logic, (3) Comprehensive API reference with error codes and rate limits, (4) Fallback strategies for missing images. Triggers: "识别图片", "读取图片", "analyze image", "read image from chat". No similar skill exists on ClawHub - fills a unique gap for cross-platform chat image analysis.
As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 11
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 11
-
medium Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlreferences/platform-api.md:185Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host)GET https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/getFile?file_id=…vendor-host -
medium Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlSKILL.md:195Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)$token = (Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/gettoken?corpid=…&corpsecret=…").access_token
quoted -
medium Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlSKILL.md:198Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/media/get?access_token=…&media_id=…" -OutFile $outputPath
quoted -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlscripts/download_image.py:117Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/getFile"vendor-hostquoted -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlSKILL.md:136Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)2. Call Bot API: `GET https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/getFile?file_id=…vendor-hostquoted -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:166Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)$token = (Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/auth/v3/tenant_access_token/internal" -Method Post -Body $body).tenant_access_token
vendor-host -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:169Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)$message = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/im/v1/messages/$messageId" -Headers @{ Authorization = "Bearer $token" }vendor-host -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:173Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/im/v1/messages/$messageId/resources/$imageKey" -Headers @{ Authorization = "Bearer $token" } -OutFile $outputPathvendor-host -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:181Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)$token = (Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://api.dingtalk.com/v1.0/oauth2/accessToken" -Method Post -Body $body).accessToken
vendor-host -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:185Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://api.dingtalk.com/v1.0/robot/messageFiles/download?downloadCode=…" -Headers @{ "x-acs-dingtalk-access-token" = $token } -OutFile $outputPathvendor-host -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlSKILL.md:213Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)$fileInfo = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://api.telegram.org/bot$token/getFile?file_id=…"
vendor-hostquoted
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
frontmatter-yamlSKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: First universal image reader for 10+ chat platforms. Features: (1)… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value - warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 51 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2130 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 2 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 506: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 41 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 51 items
- +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 59.