BC openclaw-guardian
Production-hardened OpenClaw gateway watchdog. Monitors the gateway process using graduated health checks, performs escalating repairs (restart → doctor fix → optional git rollback), alerts via Telegram and/or Discord, commits daily snapshots, and runs as a native macOS launchd or Linux systemd service.
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 6
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencescripts/install-guardian.sh:138Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)if launchctl bootstrap "gui/${uid}" "$plist_path" 2>/dev/null; thensecurity skill -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencescripts/install-guardian.sh:142Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)launchctl load -w "$plist_path" 2>/dev/null || true
security skill -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlscripts/guardian.sh:85Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)"https://api.telegram.org/bot${GUARDIAN_TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \placeholder -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencescripts/install-guardian.sh:4Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (code comment; documentation of a security skill)# macOS → launchd plist at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.guardian.plist
commentsecurity skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencescripts/uninstall-guardian.sh:23Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed; documentation of a security skill)local plist_path="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.guardian.plist"
code literalsecurity skill -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlSKILL.md:77Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)export GUARDIAN_DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL="https://discord.com/api/webhooks/..."
placeholder
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (openclaw-guardian) differs from the folder (gateway-sentinel)
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, git) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 12 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1746 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 304: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 17 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
- +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
- +3All 3 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.