SKILLEMALL.ai

BB compliance-aiops

Use this skill whenever the user needs compliance evidence from the audit trails their governed AIops agents already write — mapping AI-agent infra-ops activity to HIPAA §164.312, PCI-DSS v4.0, SOC 2 TSC, or GDPR controls, producing a change-approval report, a gap analysis, an exceptions/anomaly report, or a hash-chain-sealed, tamper-evident evidence bundle. Always use this skill for "compliance evidence", "HIPAA / PCI-DSS / SOC 2 / GDPR evidence", "audit trail report", "coverage for control X", "which controls are we short on / gap analysis", "who approved this change / change-management evidence", "denied or errored ops / anomaly evidence", "seal / sign an evidence bundle", "prove this bundle wasn't altered", or "detect deleted audit rows". Do NOT use to scan or operate infrastructure and do NOT treat it as a GRC platform — it reads the local audit databases the OTHER AIops-tools write and converts them to evidence; for platform operations use those other AIops-tools. Evidence, not certification. Reads sibling audit trails read-only; no external API, no network, no platform credentials. Fully offline and deterministic.

ClawHub Claude Code author: wei zhou v0.11.2 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 2 761 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 15 h ago

312, PCI-DSS v4.0, SOC 2 TSC, or GDPR controls, producing a change-approval report, a gap analysis, an exceptions/anomaly report, or a hash-chain-sealed…

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Shorten the description to 1024 characters.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash

A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error description-long description is 1139 chars, limit 1024
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "displayName"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "summary"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "installer"

Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 39 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2761 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +3Description length 1138: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 10 example trigger phrases
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 39 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 4)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is mostly coherent for compliance evidence, but it asks users to install mutable external code and supports unattended signed evidence generation with local secrets and no built-in approval gate.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · 12 Sept 2026