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BB firewall-aiops

Use this skill whenever the user needs to operate an OPNsense or pfSense firewall — a one-shot overview, firmware/health, interfaces and gateways, firewall rules with hit-counts and shadow analysis, NAT (port-forward/outbound/1:1), aliases and their entries, VPN (WireGuard/OpenVPN/IPsec), DHCP leases and static mappings, the firewall log and state table, three flagship RCAs (gateway health, rule hit/shadow, blocked traffic), and governed writes (toggle a rule, add/remove an alias entry, kill states, restart a service, apply/reconfigure to make edits live, reboot). Always use this skill for "OPNsense", "pfSense", "firewall rule", "port forward", "NAT", "alias", "WireGuard", "OpenVPN", "IPsec", "DHCP lease", "firewall log", "blocked traffic", "why is my WAN down", "gateway loss/latency", "unused / shadowed rules", "apply firewall changes", "reboot the firewall" when the context is an OPNsense/pfSense firewall. Do NOT use when the target is something other than an OPNsense/pfSense firewall (a hypervisor, storage appliance, backup product, container-orchestration cluster, multi-vendor router/switch config, or OT/industrial equipment) — route those to the appropriate other AIops-tools skill. Cloud security groups and vendor firewall appliances are out of scope. Governed firewall operations with a built-in governance harness (audit, policy, token budget, undo, risk-tiers). Live-verified against real OPNsense 26.7 and pfSense CE 2.7.2 on top of the mock test suite; see docs/VERIFICATION.md for exactly what each run proved and what is still untested.

ClawHub Claude Code author: wei zhou v0.12.0 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 2 763 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Use this skill whenever the user needs to operate an OPNsense or pfSense firewall — a one-shot overview, firmware/health, interfaces and gateways, firewall…

As a process B 75/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
64
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
75/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Tools and files w 18
100
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Shorten the description to 1024 characters.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error description-long description is 1569 chars, limit 1024
  • note description-budget description takes 1569 of the ~15000-char shared budget for all skills
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "displayName"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "summary"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "installer"

Process rating: all ten parameters 75/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 41 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2763 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +3Description length 1568: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 14 example trigger phrases
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 41 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 4)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is meant for firewall administration, but it needs review because it can change or reboot firewalls, handles firewall credentials, and documents unsafe connection patterns.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 12 Sept 2026