SKILLEMALL.ai

BB identity-aiops

Use this skill whenever the user needs to operate a Keycloak or authentik identity provider — a one-shot overview, realm settings, users with sessions/credentials/groups/lockout status, authentication and admin events, OAuth/OIDC clients, four flagship RCAs (login-failure/lockout-storm, stale access, client misconfiguration, MFA coverage), and governed writes (disable/enable a user, revoke sessions, require a password reset, replace redirect URIs, rotate a client secret). Always use this skill for "Keycloak", "authentik", "realm", "SSO users", "login failures", "brute force logins", "locked out users", "stale accounts", "service account misuse", "redirect URI", "PKCE", "implicit flow", "client secret rotation", "MFA coverage", "who has no 2FA" when the context is a Keycloak/authentik IdP. Do NOT use when the target is something other than a Keycloak/authentik identity provider (a hypervisor, storage appliance, backup product, container-orchestration cluster, firewall, database, or OT/industrial equipment) — route those to the appropriate other AIops-tools skill. Cloud IdPs (Okta, Entra ID, Auth0) are out of scope. Governed identity operations with a built-in governance harness (audit, policy, token budget, undo, risk-tiers).

ClawHub Claude Code author: wei zhou v0.8.2 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 3 246 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 8 h ago

Use this skill whenever the user needs to operate a Keycloak or authentik identity provider — a one-shot overview, realm settings, users with…

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Shorten the description to 1024 characters.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error description-long description is 1245 chars, limit 1024
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "displayName"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "summary"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "installer"

Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 39 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3246 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (18 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +3Description length 1244: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 13 example trigger phrases
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 39 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is for legitimate identity-provider administration, but it can perform high-impact account and OAuth changes while its approval/governance language is inconsistent and the executable package is installed unpinned.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · 12 Sept 2026