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BB inference-aiops

Use this skill whenever the user needs to operate a GPU inference cluster — vLLM (OpenAI API + Prometheus /metrics) and Ray Serve / Ray Jobs (Ray dashboard), plus the single-process serving engines SGLang and TGI (Text Generation Inference): a one-shot cluster overview (deployments + total replicas + queue backpressure), request metrics (TTFT / TPOT / e2e latency + token totals), queue depth, KV-cache stats (utilisation, prefix-cache hit rate, preemptions), the flagship latency root-cause analysis (diagnose_latency_spike / diagnose_engine_latency) and low-utilisation RCA, engine-agnostic health + running-model inventory across vLLM/SGLang/TGI, Ray Serve autoscaling and scaling (scale up/down, scale-to-zero, drain a replica), LoRA load/unload, base-model hot-swap, deploy/undeploy/redeploy, prefix-aware routing, GPU utilisation, Ray jobs, and cost per million tokens. Always use this skill for "why is inference slow", "TTFT spike", "latency spike", "GPU underutilised", "scale down the deployment", "scale to zero", "drain a replica before a reboot", "hot-swap the base model", "load a LoRA adapter", "KV cache pressure", "prefix cache hit rate", "queue backpressure", "autoscale config", "SGLang health", "TGI metrics", or "cost per token" when the context is a vLLM / SGLang / TGI / Ray Serve inference cluster. Do NOT use for non-inference infrastructure (hypervisors, storage appliances, backup products, general container/cluster workloads, network devices, or OT/industrial equipment) — those belong to other AIops-tools; this skill is scoped to GPU inference serving (vLLM + Ray). Governed vLLM + Ray inference operations with a built-in governance harness (audit, policy, token budget, undo, risk-tiers).

ClawHub Claude Code author: wei zhou v0.10.2 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 3 032 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 21 h ago

Use this skill whenever the user needs to operate a GPU inference cluster — vLLM (OpenAI API + Prometheus /metrics) and Ray Serve / Ray Jobs (Ray dashboard)…

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
64
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Shorten the description to 1024 characters.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error description-long description is 1724 chars, limit 1024
  • note description-budget description takes 1724 of the ~15000-char shared budget for all skills
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "displayName"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "summary"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "installer"

Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 21 mutating operations with no state check
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 44 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3032 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +3Description length 1723: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 16 example trigger phrases
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 44 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 4)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is transparent about managing inference clusters, but it exposes disruptive write controls without an enforced authorization or read-only gate and installs an unpinned external executable.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 12 Sept 2026