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AB veeam-aiops

Use this skill whenever the user needs to operate Veeam Backup & Replication — a one-shot health overview, read-only diagnostics / RCA (triage failed backup-job sessions and flag repositories low on space), list/inspect/start/stop/retry backup jobs, enable/disable jobs, list restore points and start a VM restore, list backup repositories with capacity, list stored backups and their objects, inventory backup infrastructure (managed servers, proxies), and poll/stop async sessions for job/restore progress. Always use this skill for "list veeam jobs", "run veeam backup", "start veeam job", "veeam restore", "veeam repository", "veeam backup status", or "veeam session" when the context is explicitly Veeam / Veeam Backup & Replication / VBR. Do NOT use when the target is not Veeam Backup & Replication (other backup products, hypervisor lifecycle, or cloud providers are out of scope). Common Veeam B&R operations with a built-in governance harness (audit, policy, token budget, undo, risk-tiers).

ClawHub Claude Code author: wei zhou v0.16.0 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 3 385 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 8 h ago

Use this skill whenever the user needs to operate Veeam Backup & Replication — a one-shot health overview, read-only diagnostics / RCA (triage failed…

As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

AnalyzerKubernetesGitHubAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
92
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
72/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Bash

    Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "displayName"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "summary"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "installer"
    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 147): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 29 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3385 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (9 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +3Description length 1001: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 7 example trigger phrases
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +4Structure: 23 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 29 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 4)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 92.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is openly aimed at Veeam backup operations, but it can perform high-impact write and restore actions without an enforced MCP approval or read-only boundary.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 13 Sept 2026