AB vmware-harden
Use this skill whenever the user needs to perform VMware cyber compliance auditing (aligned with VCF 9 Advanced Cyber Compliance / ACC), baseline checking, or drift detection on vSphere/ESXi/NSX environments. Directly handles: CIS / vSphere SCG / 等保 2.0 三级 / PCI-DSS / BSI IT-Grundschutz / EU NIS2 scans; custom YAML baselines; LLM-driven remediation suggestions; web dashboard. Always use this skill for "scan compliance", "check baseline", "audit etcd", "check 等保", "drift detection", "compliance report", "cyber compliance scan", "ACC posture", "STIG check" when the context is explicitly VMware/vSphere/ESXi. Do NOT use for general vSphere monitoring (use vmware-monitor or vmware-aiops), network changes (use vmware-nsx), or executing remediations directly (this skill only suggests; execution goes through vmware-pilot).
Use this skill whenever the user needs to perform VMware cyber compliance auditing (aligned with VCF 9 Advanced Cyber Compliance / ACC), baseline checking, or…
As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
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medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash Read Write
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "installer" - note
edit-residuethe text marks something as outdated (lines 163): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions
Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4182 tokens
- 85Steps. 32 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +3Description length 826: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 9 example trigger phrases
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +4Structure: 21 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 32 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 6)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 93.