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DF session-manager-zx

(no description)

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Roxy18 v1.0.4 MIT-0 11 files · 6 scripts body ≈ 1 227 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 35/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: LICENSE

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
42/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
70
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
35/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: LICENSE
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
  3. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

  • high Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/setup-proxy.sh:80
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service)
    return 302 http://\$host:$OPENCLAW_PORT/?session=…&token=…
Medium and low: 4
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/setup-proxy.sh:69
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo tee "$CONFIG_FILE" > /dev/null << NGINX_EOF
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:212
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm /etc/nginx/sites-enabled/openclaw-username
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/create-users.sh:121
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "  - 删除用户：sudo rm /etc/nginx/sites-enabled/openclaw-<用户名>"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/setup-proxy.sh:128
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "   删除用户：sudo rm /etc/nginx/sites-enabled/openclaw-$USERNAME"
    code literal

Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: LICENSE

Process rating: all ten parameters 35/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: LICENSE
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: LICENSE
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 100Steps. 35 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1227 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -231 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 31 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 35 items
  • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
  • +3All 5 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill includes useful session cleanup, but it should be reviewed because its proxy features can change system Nginx configuration and expose access tokens.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 28 May 2026