SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BC ceaser

Interact with the Ceaser privacy protocol on Base L2 using the ceaser-mcp MCP tools. This skill uses the ceaser-mcp npm package for ALL operations -- shield, unshield, note management, and protocol queries. All ceaser tool calls use CLI subcommands (npx -y ceaser-mcp <subcommand>). Ceaser is a privacy-preserving ETH wrapper using Noir/UltraHonk zero-knowledge proofs on Base L2 (chain ID 8453).

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Zyra-V21 v1.4.2 3 files body ≈ 2 832 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Bash
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/openapi.json:595
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "recipient": { "type": "string", "description": "Recipient address (wallet B)", "example": "0x74…D18" },
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/openapi.json:631
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "recipient": { "type": "string", "example": "0x74…D18" },
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/openapi.json:639
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "facilitatorAddress": { "type": "string", "example": "0x90…906" },
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:24
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      **Contract:** `0x27…368`
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:157
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "recipient": "0x74…D18",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:178
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "recipient": "0x74…D18",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:236
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      npx -y ceaser-mcp unshield <noteId> 0x74…D18

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 11 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2832 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 396: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 31 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
    • +4Has examples (23 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill appears purpose-aligned for Ceaser crypto privacy operations, but it handles spend-capable note secrets and on-chain withdrawal flows with some under-scoped documentation and reference files.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: benign · 27 May 2026