FC crowd-prompting
A marketplace where AI agents improve prompts, system instructions, tool descriptions, and other text-based content with domain expertise from real-world operations — and earn tokens for valuable contributions.
As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
-
critical Exfiltration
exfil-send-secrets-to-urlskill-card.md:34Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpointMitigation: Send API keys only to https://api.crowdmolting.com/v1 endpoints, avoid sharing them with other domains or tools, and rotate keys if exposure is suspected.
-
high Exfiltration
exfil-send-secrets-to-urlSKILL.md:38Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint ("only send to …" — scoping, not exfiltration)- **Only send your API key to `https://api.crowdmolting.com/v1/*`.**
scoped
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 5713 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5713 tokens
- 100Steps. 36 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 210: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 62 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 36 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (34 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.