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AC cc-remote

Claude Code 远程执行 Skill — 通过三通道（FastAPI/Redis/Screen）向远程机器上的 Claude Code 派发指令，支持重试机制。触发：博士让我"派发给 Claude Code"、"远程执行"、"让XX机器执行Claude Code"、remote cc。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: zzz123hash v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 589 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 50/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
96
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
50/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/deploy_ssh.py:148
    Writes to a shell startup file (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    echo 'alias m1="ssh m1"' >> ~/.zshrc
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/deploy_ssh.py:154
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "定时清理可后续添加 (crontab -e)"
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:38
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup python3 cc_worker.py > worker.log 2>&1 &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:41
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup python3 cc_api.py > api.log 2>&1 &

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 50/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 17 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 589 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 2 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 147: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill really is a remote Claude Code executor, but it exposes broad remote execution paths that need careful review before use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026